Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking

Member Ros-Lehtinen and everybody who is still here and to you

in the audience as well. That is a good sign.

Let me just say one thing at the outset. I work for Senator

Obama. I advise him, as an unpaid adviser, on the issues we are

discussing today, but I want to reinforce the fact that I am here

speaking on my own accord as a Stanford professor.

I just happened to bring some statements. If anyone wants to

know what the Senator has said, I have them right here, and I will

let them speak for themselves and let me speak for myself today.

I tell you, I am not thrilled to be here, just like the last time you

asked me to fly across the country to talk to you. This is not the

kind of Russia that I had hoped for 20 years ago when I was involved

in trying to work inside Russia. It is most certainly not the

kind of United States-Russia relationship that I had envisioned 20

years ago when I got involved in these issues.

I do think we have to have a bigger picture, however, involved.

We have been focused in the weeds, rightly, about what happened

in Tskhinvali and what the Russian response was, and I really do

think it is important to get those facts straight. I happen to think

it was a really ill-considered mistake that President Saakashvili

decided to do what he did in Tskhinvali, and, in my written re48

marks—I have them all there, and, without objection, I would like

to have those in the record——

All of that is very important, but we should not

get, in some way, distracted from the fact that Russia has a grand

strategy that it has been pursuing, not just in August but for several

years, in the region, and, most certainly, I think Mr.

Saakashvili made mistakes, but let us also not make the mistake

of getting in a tit-for-tat of who fired what first because it is a bigger

enterprise and a bigger strategy.

In my opinion, if we are going to face it properly, we also have

to have a bigger strategy. I am dismayed—I have to tell you honestly—

by the way we have been debating this issue so far, and if

I could oversimplify what I read in the New York Times today and

the press, there are only two responses that the United States can have.

One is business as usual. We need Russia, for instance, for a

U.N. Security Council resolution on Iran, and, therefore, we have

to soft-pedal what we say about Georgia. I think that is very shortsighted

and not strategic and, really, fundamentally, misunderstands

how Russia defines its own interests.

You are not going to get a U.N. Security Council resolution on

Iran because of soft-pedaling what you say about Georgia. That is

not the way the Russian leadership thinks, and we, I think, are

doing ourselves a disfavor to think business as usual will yield a

different result in terms of Russia’s grand strategy and Russia’s

definition of its own national interests.

At the same time, the Congress, the other extreme of isolation,

kicking them out of this club and the other club; that also, I think,

is an oversimplified way to think about our grand strategy.

So what I tried to do in my remarks was to lay out a truly big,

comprehensive strategy that I will not try to rehearse in detail for

you right now, but it consists of 12 steps—not one, not two, not a

sound bite—but 12 steps we should do if we want to play on an

equal playing field with the Russians in thinking about our own national interests.

Let me just go through, and I want to highlight two at the end, in particular.

First, we need to reunify our alliance. The fact that we are not

unified on this issue is hurting us. There is no doubt about that, in my mind.

Second, we need to affirm our Article V commitments to our

NATO Alliance partners. There are doubts among them. We need to affirm them.

Third, we need to affirm our recognition of Georgian territorial

integrity and make clear, under no circumstances will we ever recognize

the territories of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent

countries. I disagree radically with the notion that

Abkhazia and Kosovo are the same, and maybe we can get into

that during the question period.

I would just note that at the time of Georgian independence, only

18 percent of the population of Abkhazia was ethnic Abkhaz, and

it was ethnic cleansing, sponsored by the Russians, that has cre49

ated the situation here. That is the exact opposite of what NATO was doing in Kosovo.

Fourth, we have to rebuild Russia. You spent a lot of time on

that. But, Mr. Chairman, I really support, and strongly endorse,

your idea that a big chunk of that needs to be democracy assistance.

Georgian democracy and, especially, independent media,

needs our support, especially right now.

Fifth, we have to preemptively reduce the potential for Russian

mischief against Ukraine. I outlined the remarks. I will just skip that for now.

Sixth, I think we have to have a U.N. Security Council vote, even

if Russia vetoes it, and continue to demonstrate how isolated Russia

is on this issue. Again, it is not like Kosovo. There is one other

country in the world that has recognized these two territories—that

is Nicaragua—and the more we do that, including with China, including

with other countries that generally support Russia, the better we are.

Seventh, we need to reduce dependency of Russian energy exports

in Europe and Eurasia. My testimony outlines three very constructive ways to do that.

Eighth, together with our allies, and I want to stress, it has to

be with our allies or it does not matter at all, I think we have to

consider future punitive measures against Russia if they do not adhere

to the cease-fire, if they do not adhere to the terms and pull

back to August 7th levels.

I outlined some ideas that I have in my written testimony. I

think companies that begin to work inside these two territories

should be sanctioned, and countries that recognize them should

also be sanctioned. Maybe we can talk about that more in detail in questions.

Ninth, we have to increase the independent flow of information

into this region. Your budgets that you have been approving for

Voice of America and Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, in my

opinion, simply do not reflect American strategic interests. By my

estimation, it is about $800 million, all total, and only $9 million of that goes to Russia.

If you have watched the Russian news, as I have, it is gross and

appalling, Soviet-style propaganda, and I know—I lived in the Soviet

Union. I know what it looks like. This is what it is. We have

to be engaged in helping to let Russians have independent sources of news.

Tenth, we cannot give up on Russian democracy or democracy in

any of these regions. When I look at your budgets for the Freedom

Support Act, and I see that they have been halved in the last 8

years—and I want to emphasize this, halved—there are only two

explanations: One is that there is just a gross misunderstanding by

the Bush administration and the United States Congress about the

status of democracy in Russia and Georgia and Ukraine and the region;

or this is a statement of defeatism. That means you have

given up on democracy.

I strongly urge you to reconsider those numbers moving forward,

and that is something the Congress can do, irrespective of who is

in the White House. You have to have a real review of what we

have gotten, and, I think, to spend more money. Without a real

evaluation of what we have gotten for that money in the last 8

years would be irresponsible as the U.S. Congress, and I outline

what should happen. But to give up now, I think, is really shortsighted.

Eleven, and I will end on this, doing all of these things does not

mean that we do not talk directly to the Russians about our interests

and things that we care about. That means talking to them

about reducing nuclear arsenals, nonproliferation, dealing with

Iran. But we do it not as a favor to them, we do it not asking them

to do us a favor, because they do not think that way, so if we impose

that way of thinking, I think we are really naive. But we can

talk to them, as we did during the Cold War, by the way, at the

height of some of the most tense times, and, at the same time, do these other measures.

And then, finally, as I end my oral remarks, we have to keep the

door open for a different Russian response. We have a national security

interest in Russia being in all of the Western institutions.

And I would say, and I have said many times before, a democratic

Russia should be allowed to apply for membership in NATO as

well. I want to emphasize the adjective, ‘‘democratic Russia,’’ not the current Russia.

We want to keep that door open that should Russia and Russians,

because they do not all think alike, reverse their course and

want to reintegrate, we have to keep that door open. Thank you.

I just had a couple; one empirical point and one judgment.

On the first discussion, Ukraine and Georgia are

very different. Georgia had 30,000 troops, I think, before the fighting;

Ukraine has 300,000 troops and there is no pretext there, although

I think we need to be—and this gets to my answer to your

second question—we need to be forward leaning on the diplomatic

side, engaging with our friends in Kiev today, as we should have, in my opinion.

I, frankly, find it rather mysterious, with all due respect to my

good friend, Ambassador Fried, to hear the comments. Georgia is

the most pro-American country in the world. Maybe Iranian people

might be second. But having been to both of those places recently,

this is a place where, if we do not have leverage in dealing with

our friends in Georgia, we have no leverage anywhere else.

I am perplexed, and I think we need to understand, how we let

our good allies make mistakes that we are now calling mistakes,

and the same with Ukraine today. What is happening with the

Government in Ukraine, in my opinion, is it could not happen at

a worse time, the fighting between President Yushchenko and

Prime Minister Tymoshenko. If they are our partners, and if they

aspire to be our NATO Alliance partners, which I support, they

have to act like stable, responsible partners because what we are

doing is we are creating a pretext.

A pretext did not exist just 2 weeks ago. Now, if you read the

Russian press, they are talking about Yushchenko and military

coups and all of that, and, do not get me wrong, the pretext is a

pretext, on purpose, but we want to take that off the table in both

of these places, and, leaning forward diplomatically rather than responding

reactively with our defensive rearmament.

So, first, on Iran, I am a student of Russian contemporary

history but also Soviet history, and the idea that we can

meet with them in New York and say, ‘‘Okay, we are going to be

quiet about South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and you give us the vote,’’

I was thinking—because I knew you were going to ask a question

like that, you or somebody—and I was looking at what is a precedent

in Russian or Soviet history where this works, and I had a

real hard time finding any precedent.

I think it is naive. It is not the way our Government works, so

why should we think that it would be the way their government

works, this kind of tit-for-tat, we are going to trade this for that.

I would invoke for you the person who I think understood this best

of all, my colleague at Stanford, George Shultz. I think it is on

page 276 of his memoirs, if you want to look it up, where he says,

very explicitly, this notion of linkage does not work in that kind of way.

Russia is going to vote. We need to engage Russia to understand

why Russia would have an interest in a nuclear Iran and to have

that dialogue and to have a bigger, more interesting, more developed

dialogue about that. I am all for that, but the notion that they

are going to somehow give us a vote at the U.N., no. They are

going to do exactly what you would expect your administration to

do, which is to look hard at how they define their national interest

and then vote accordingly, not as some favor to Russia or China or

Iraq or anybody, for that matter.

. First of all, I learned a lot, sitting here listening

to your questions with Secretary Fried, so I appreciate the lesson.

I think it is very important. I think it is fundamentally important

that it was China, that it was the Shanghai Cooperation

Agreement, that none of them, and Russia went there, the President

went there, they went there to get the acquiescence, and they

did not get it, and I think that sends a message that this is not

like these other cases you all were discussing; and, two, that Russia

is really isolated.

This may give me a chance to say something I did not in my initial

remarks. We are not the only ones following this. There are

Russians also following this, and it is not just my democratic opposition

friends, who, by the way, passed resolutions denouncing only

what Russia did being not in Russia’s national interests—right?—

so there are voices saying, We need to have a notion about this, but

also denounce the illegality of what Russia did, both in using force

and in recognizing these two territories.

By the way, it is not just the opposition. It is the business elite.

About $300 billion has been lost on the Russian stock market since

this has happened. Actually, it is more than that, $600 billion or

$700 billion, and those that follow it closely say about $300 billion

is directly attributable to this war.

So people are having this discussion and saying, just like the

Chinese, just like in Azerbaijan, is this really in our interests, as Russians?

If I could just add a couple of ideas. I have written

a whole book about it, so I will send it to you. Two and a half big

things: One is, we could have done more, and I agree, and that is

what the book is about, that we did not, in a way, like Fred was

mentioning today, in a way, we did not realize the bigness of the

moment, at the collapse of the Soviet Union.

If you remember, we were in an election year soon after that and

the phrase that won the election was, ‘‘It is the economy, stupid.’’

Right? It was not, like, 1946 or 1947 or 1948 where we thought,

if we could just integrate this struggling democracy, seeking to create

democratic institutions and market institutions and integrate

into the West. We did not have the big strategy, and I think, for

a variety of reasons, in the book, I could tell you, partly, that is

our fault.

Second, it is not all our fault. I do not think it is just a coincidence

that, as Russia has become increasingly autocratic, I do not

consider Russia today a democracy, and, as it has become increasingly

autocratic, it has become more belligerent, not only toward

democracies on its borders but toward the West and the United

States, and that is a fact that is bigger than just Russia. Understanding

that fundamental relationship that we sometimes get confused

about; that, I think, we could have seen coming.

By the way, I wrote about it 8 years ago, under the Clinton administration,

just to be clear, and I was reprimanded by Secretary

Albright for the day the piece came out when I said we are not paying

enough attention to this.

So it is a nonpartisan comment that I am making, but that was

8 years ago, and the fact that we did not focus on this, that we let

the relationship drift, that we got focused on other security interests

and that we do not have much. So when we get to August 6,

2008, when you look at, well, what is left in the bilateral relationship,

there is not a lot of ‘‘there’’ there, and so Russia and the Russian

leadership—I want to make clear because Russia did not decide;

the Russian leadership did—when they made the decision to

go into Georgia, the states, the negative states, in terms of our bilateral

relationship, were actually rather low, and that, I do think,

is our responsibility as well.

I will send you a copy for free.

If I may, first, I absolutely believed and continue

to believe in the future that there is no reason why Russia cannot

be a strong ally of the United States, and, in the nineties, when

there was a democratic Russia, and when Boris Yeltsin was leaning

forward, these peacekeepers that we now have to call ‘‘alleged

peacekeepers,’’ they were peacekeepers, and they were peacekeepers

because the policy of Moscow was fundamentally different

in Abkhazia and South Ossetia at the time.

Because Mr. Putin is not—whether we are to

blame or he is to blame, but he has fundamentally given up on two

projects that were alive 20 years ago: (1) democracy in Russia, and

he has rolled it back 100 percent, and let us have no illusions about

that; and (2) integration into the West, and he does not believe that

anymore. I have followed this gentleman. I met him in 1992, just

so you know. I met him a long time ago, 1991, actually.

In my opinion, he has a very classic, 19th-century notion of Russian

power, and so when it is the military, there is a famous slogan

that ‘‘Russia does not have any allies but its military and its

Navy,’’ and he would now add GAZPROM. Right? So GAZPROM is

not a company seeking to maximize—I do not know if you have any

shares in GAZPROM, Congressman, but it is not to make you

wealthy. It is to exercise Russian power, and that is the way he

thinks, and that is fundamentally different than the leadership

that was in power in Russia 15 years ago.

I also want to report, though, that it is not consensus, the way

Mr. Putin thinks, inside Russia today. Even I would dare say, even

within the Russian Government today, there is a real division

about, you know, the cost-benefit analysis of where ‘‘Mr. Putin’s

war,’’ as they call it, is taking Russia, and if we had that relationship,

then we could do missile defense cooperatively. That is an

idea that is 20 years old, by the way.

If we had that cooperation, then Russia could actually do important

things in a military alliance of some sort with the United

States. They have assets that could be very important to us. I am

really glad you brought it up. You can tell I am a little passionate

about it.

This notion that somehow there is a genetic code for imperialism;

now that is the stuff my grandfather’s generation said about Germans

and Japanese. That is not useful in terms of understanding

Russia today.

If I may, I am also an American patriot. I have

also lived in the Soviet Union and Russia for several years of my

life. Some of my closest personal friends in my BlackBerry, on

speed dial, are Russians. Okay?

All right? This is not about Russians and Americans;

it is about the Russian Government, in my opinion.

Just a couple of reactions. I, too, before you got here, I also think

it was a really ill-considered notion, and it is in my written testimony,

what happened in Tskhinvali. I think that was a mistake.

There were civilians that were lost. We should have an investigation

of that, and we should acknowledge that.

Having said that, one should be able to say that first and then

say, secondly, it is not right for a country to invade another country

and then to unilaterally dismember it. We should be able to have

those two thoughts together, and, in my opinion, the first does not

justify the second.

Yes. I am not suggesting that. It is a statement of

fact.

Well, let us get to those two places.

First of all, before Russia invaded Georgia, every

country in the world recognized those two territories, including the

Russian Federation, as part of Georgia. There is not a single country

in the world that ever recognized them as independent.

Second, we have to go back a little bit in history. Do you know—

because you were asking the rhetorical question, let me ask you—

do you know how many Abkhazians lived in Georgia and Abkhazia

in, say, 1989 or 1990?

In the state of Abkhazia, how many were there?

I know, 18 percent.

Right. So 82 percent were non-ethnic Abkhaz.

Right?

So what happened to them? There was ethnic

cleaning in Abkhazia that was recognized, if I may remind us all,

at the OSCE——

I just find it——

If I could just finish.

Well, I would respectfully disagree.

And I would just remind you that the Government

of Georgia recognized the ethnic cleansing that I am talking about

at three OSCE meetings in the 1990s. This does not go back to the

13th century; this is something that just happened a decade ago,

and those displaced people are still living in Georgia and the same in Ossetia.

I think the substantial majority were. It was a mix,

by the way. It was not just Georgians and Abkhaz, but six different ethnic groups there.

My point is, one, I do not see the parallel at all to

Kosovo. We were using our force to stop ethnic cleansing. The Russians

were using their force to promote it.

But, second, where do you stop? So Chechnya; do they get a

state? Does Dagestan get a state?

No, but the 40 percent or 38 percent of ethnic Russians

that live in Kazakhstan; if they want to declare their own

state. I guess we just disagree.

I mean, I think your scenario leads to, you know,

what we saw in the Balkans but with countries with nuclear weapons,

and I think the big dog that did not bark, I am struck by——

No. I supported it.

But with all due respect, Congressman, one was to

stop ethnic cleansing, the Russian use of force in Georgia—— And it was not even supported by

Boris Yeltsin, by the way, was to promote ethnic cleansing, and I

think we cannot make those kinds of false parallels.

I have many comments, and you are going to tell me when I am done.

A couple of things: I share your concern about the decisions that

Mr. Saakashvili made. I have them in my testimony, where I say,

very clearly, ‘‘Irrespective of who moved to escalate, the Georgian

Government’s decision to use military force to assert its sovereignty

over South Ossetia, which included sending its forces into the

South Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, was shortsighted and ill considered.

We have no disagreement about that.’’ That is the first thing I would say.

The second thing I would say, I am delighted that the folks you

cited inside Georgia are beginning to speak up and having a debate,

and that is a good sign, and a healthy sign, about Georgian

democracy. When I was at the convention in Denver a couple of

weeks ago, there was a Georgian delegation there that did not just

represent Mr. Saakashvili, and, at an appropriate time and place—

the country, after all, is under military assault—there needs to be

an appropriate time and place—they are going to have that discussion.

I am very optimistic about that, and I would hope you would

all do the things necessary to help them to have the instruments to do it.

For instance, independent media, as you rightly said about 3

hours ago, is under assault in Georgia, and what happened in November,

there is no excuse for it, in my opinion. So we should be

supporting independent media in Georgia so that they can have

that debate, and I think that is a healthy thing, and the Georgian

people should one day have the right, and they will because they

live in a democracy, unlike in Russia, they are going to have a say about what happens.

The only other thing I would say is it is not just enough to figure

out who shot first. I have looked at this very closely. I grew up in

a town called Butte, Montana. I do not know if anybody has been

to Butte. Butte is a pretty rough town. All right. Good. So you know.

Well, I grew up with a couple of guys called Eddie and the

Fishlips. They were bullies, and every day when I walked home

from school, they came up to me, and they taunted me, and they

were trying to pick a fight. My mother said, ‘‘Do not swing unless

you know that you can take on those three. Do not be an idiot,’’

in other words. Well, one day I was an idiot, and they beat the hell

out of me. That, I think, is the right analogy here.

To think that somehow Russia has just been sitting by quietly,

waiting to defend the poor South Ossetians, which, by the way, is

a giant police state, thug state, human trafficking—we have not

even talked about what South Ossetia really is——

Much, much worse that Uzbekistan.

As somebody who was kicked out of Uzbekistan

many years ago, much, much worse, which is to say, they have

been wanting this fight for a long time, which is no excuse for what

Saakashvili did. Do not get me wrong.

But we have to be able to separate those two

things. Russia has been wanting to do this. They have had their sanctions——

If I could make one small point. It is very important.

What we really need to look at is the missed diplomatic

mistakes before the war, and that, by the way, we all knew

it. Senator Obama said it many times on the record that this war

is going to happen. Georgia should not take the bait. That discussion,

and that, I put upon you, to explore that because that, to me,

is the real failure. We are paying for our failed diplomacy with that

$1 billion check. This could have been avoided, in my opinion.

That is right.

It happened after that and while the

Russians were still in violation of that cease-fire, which they are,

to this day, still in violation on multiple points and not just this issue.

If the Russians had pushed back the Georgian troops that invaded

South Ossetia and reestablished the borders of the area and

stopped, we would not be having this conversation, and we could,

instead, have a very elegant, nuanced discussion about who was

right and who was wrong and even what the international legalities

are because, frankly, I find them rather complicated.

But they did not stop there. The Russians conducted a systemic,

strategic bombing campaign aimed at destroying the Georgian military.

There has been no more flagrant violation of international

law that I can think of since the invasion of Kuwait, and that is

why, with respect to Mr. Delahunt, elements of this discussion are

black and white, and the international legal situation here is very

black and white, and I think that, unless we recognize that, we are

nowhere in this conversation.

Mr. Chairman, just briefly addressing your point, if I thought——

I want to address your 30,000-feet question, if I

may, about the relationship, in general, which I think is important,

and we have not spent enough time on.

I think you have to go back to the beginning of the Bush administration

when they made a bet on Putin. The President himself

said it in their first meeting: ‘‘He is a man I trust.’’ You all know

his comment. I had seen the President, by the way, just a few

weeks before then. I then commented in the New York Times, on

page 1, he made a ‘‘rookie mistake’’ and was never invited back to

see him again, by the way, after that comment.

But it was a gamble, and the idea was—I know it seems like ancient

history, but it was a gamble because it was before September

11th. It was a gamble. It was the idea, Look, we want to build missile

defense. That is all they wanted to do at the time. They cannot

stop us. We want to get his acquiescence to it, and if I reach out

to him and have a personal relationship with him, we will get it,

and they did. I remembered running into Condoleezza Rice several

weeks afterwards and saying, ‘‘Well, maybe I was wrong. He got

the deal. I was surprised.’’

Then September 11th happened, and we missed a big opportunity,

in my opinion, to restructure this relationship on the basis

of mutual security interests, and when we go back and look at that

history, and you should, and I think it is wise, no matter who wins,

before the next administration takes over, to look at that because

we had a bunch of opportunities to build on that, in retrospect, we

did not build upon.

We got distracted other places. We did not think we needed the

Russians. To say it very bluntly, we thought we could do a lot of

things unilaterally, and missile defense is a great example. This is

a no-brainer. They have technologies. We could have cooperated on

it. We could have done it together. We could have informed our allies

about it, by the way, before we announced it. That is diplomacy.

I could blame you all, too. Jackson-Vanik. Remember that? It

sounds like ancient history now, but when you talk to Russians,

they look, and they say, ‘‘If you cannot even retire something that

is a Cold War relic, then we do not think you are credible on any

of this other stuff.’’ Now, whether that is right or wrong, their perspective,

but I am reporting to you, that is a pretty low bar to jump

over, going back all the way to the beginning of 8 years ago.

So we look at it, and there is no ‘‘there’’ there. When I looked

at that—— Or even 17 years, fair enough. When I look at the

Sochi Agreement that President Bush went and signed with President

Putin, I look at it, and it is exactly the talking points from

the beginning of the administration.

So, moving forward, if you do not have any ‘‘there’’ there, then

there is no stake, and there is not much agreement, and there is

not much talking about interests. We can disagree, but, at least,

we should have some dialogue. You, yourself, said, ‘‘We should, at

least, be sending our diplomats, our senior diplomats, to Moscow

and agree to disagree rather than not talking past each other.’’

Here, not to keep invoking my friend, George Schultz, but when

George Schultz talks about diplomacy, he compares it to gardening.

He says, ‘‘It is boring, it is not very interesting, but you have got

to do it every day because if you do not do it every day, some day

you will walk out, and you will see your garden, and it is going to

be filled with weeds.’’ I think that is a metaphor for United States-

Russian relations over this last several years, whether you start 8

or 15, to make it nonpartisan, but we have not been nurturing this

relationship because we thought this one was over.

We thought, This is over. The Cold War is over, Russia does not

matter, Congressman, your point—Senator someday—your point

about, you know, that we just checked out, we did not think about

Russian interests, and, frankly, we were distracted with other theaters

that we thought were more important, of our own choosing,

and now we have come back to realize that there are other strategic

interests that we have.

And the one footnote, because I keep skipping your

question about Iran: I would say we want to work with Russia. Of

course, we do, and we want those U.N. Security Council Resolutions,

but I have to say—I work on Iran in another project—to

think that that is the only thing, and I know you do not think this——

But if we could just get our European

allies to go along with some sanctions, we could bring a lot more

pressure to bear.

That is another hearing, yes.